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enforcement of E.U. antitrust law.' The Leniency Program is governed
by a Leniency Notice that sets out the policies and procedures for appli-
cations and determinations of leniency.2 While few may question the role
of the Leniency Program, many antitrust commentators and practitioners
are concerned about the future of the Commission's program in light of
the inconsistent application of U.S. civil discovery rules to Leniency
Program submissions.
The discovery of the Leniency submissions in private civil actions in
the United States is one of the key issues facing current E.U. antitrust
law for two reasons. First, discovery creates a disincentive for cartel
members to cooperate with the Commission in dismantling secret car-
tels, thus hampering the effectiveness of the Leniency Program. The
economic benefits derived from cooperation with the Program are offset
by the potential economic harms in the form of damages in a private civil
action in the United States. Second, discovery of Leniency submissions
creates the perverse result of placing undertakings that cooperate with a
Commission investigation by disclosing their infringement in a worse
position than those that keep evidence and knowledge of their infringe-
ment secret.3
On several occasions, the Commission has expressed its concern re-
garding the discovery of Leniency submissions in U.S. federal courts.
The Commission's arguments are predicated on the principle of interna-
tional comity, which allows courts and administrative agencies to strike a
balance between the different, but not necessarily conflicting, interests of
the sovereigns involved in the discovery process Nevertheless, there is
cause for concern since U.S. courts generally address the principle of
international comity on a case-by-case basis, creating a lack of certainty
as to "how [U.S.] courts will apply their wide discretion in ordering dis-
I. See Commission Notice on the Non-Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel
Cases, 1996 O.J. (C 207) 4 [hereinafter Commission Notice] (establishing the E.U. Antitrust
Leniency Program); see also infra text accompanying note 50 (discussing the effectiveness of
the Leniency Program).
2. See Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel
Cases, 2006 O.J. (C 298) [hereinafter New Leniency Notice] (constituting the most recent
enactment of the Leniency Program).
3. Patricia Carmona Botana, Prevention and Deterrence of Collusive Behavior: The
Role of Leniency Programs, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 47, 74 (2006); see also New Leniency
Notice, supra note 2, 6.
4. The E.U. Commission has intervened in several proceedings before U.S. courts as
amicus curiae in support of the party opposing discovery of Leniency documents. See, e.g., In
re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 99-197, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25815, at *31 (D.D.C.
Dec. 18, 2002).
5. See, e.g., id. at *34; see also Kristina Nordlander, Discovering Discovery-U.S.
Discovery of EC Leniency Statements, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. [E.C.L.R.] 646, 655-58
(2004) (noting that, along with international comity arguments, the Commission previously
opposed discovery of Leniency documents on the basis of investigatory privilege).
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covery of (no pre-existing) statements and submissions specifically pre-
pared by undertakings for the Commission's antitrust procedures. 6 This
"resulting uncertainty" potentially undermines the effectiveness of the
Leniency Program and the related ability of the Commission to success-
fully detect and punish cartels.7
In a recent case that addressed the issue of discovery of Leniency
Program submissions in U.S. Courts, Magistrate Judge Bernard Zim-
merman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
held that the plaintiff, Kumho Petrochemical Company, was not entitled
to receive the highly confidential submissions that defendant, Flexsys
America's European affiliate, made in connection with the Leniency Pro-
gram.8 Judge Zimmerman offered a comprehensive overview of the
comity analysis involved in determining whether discovery of a Leni-
ency applicant's submissions was proper.9
This Note provides a European perspective on the issues raised by In
re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation (Rubber Chemicals), and ex-
presses concern regarding the inconsistent approach taken by U.S. courts
to the discoverability of the Leniency submissions.'° This Note also
warns that this inconsistency may have a chilling effect on participation
in the E.U. Leniency Program and may thus impede enforcement of
European anti-cartel law. Part I briefly describes cartels and the anti-
cartel policy adopted by the E.U. Commission. Part II discusses the E.U.
Leniency Program and the provisions governing the discoverability of
Leniency documents. Particular emphasis is dedicated to the Leniency
Program's incentives affecting, and fostering, cartel members' coopera-
tion, as well as to the central role played by the program in the
enforcement of E.U. antitrust law. Part II also examines the impact of
U.S. discovery rules on the recently adopted Settlement Procedure in
cartel cases in the European Union. Part III offers an overview of the
U.S. discovery rules and their application to documents located abroad.
Part IV provides a synthesis of the principle of international comity as it
is understood through U.S. case law, as well as through the international
agreements entered into by the United States and the European Union.
6. See Submission by the Directorate General for Competition of the European
Commission, Philip Lowe, Dir. Gen., to Andrew Heimert, Executive Dir., Antitrust
Modernization Comm'n, COMP A/4 D(2006) 83, at 1 (Apr. 4, 2006), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public-studies-fr28902/internationalpdf/060406 DGComp_
Intl.pdf [hereinafter Submission by the Directorate General for Competition of the European
Commission].
7. Id.
8. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
9. Id. at 1082-84.
10. As discussed infra Part lI.C, the discovery concerns only relate to a particular, lim-
ited type of document submitted for the Leniency Program-the corporate statements.
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Part V discusses the merits of the District Court's order in the Rubber
Chemicals case and its implications for future cases. Part VI highlights
the harmful effects that the inconsistent construction of the comity
principle, and the subsequent application of U.S. discovery rules to
Leniency documents, has on the international fight against cartels, and
advocates a prompt change in the U.S. judiciary's approach to discov-
ery of E.U. Leniency documents.
I. SECRET CARTELS AND E.U. ANTI-CARTEL POLICIES
"United we stand, divided we fall.
Unity gives strength.""
Cartels are agreements or concerted practices between two or more
undertakings aimed.at coordinating their competitive behavior in the
market in order to maximize their profits. 2 A cartel scheme allows an
undertaking to realize future gains otherwise hard to achieve in a com-
petitive market by limiting output, or fixing the price of goods or
services, or both, at the consumer's expense.'3 At the same time, a car-
tel succeeds only to the extent that its members abide by the cartel
rules, thus preserving the cartel equilibrium. 4 No deviation is allowed.
In particular, each undertaking must share the total cartel gain with the
other members as agreed in the cartel agreement, usually in a manner
that reflects the individual member's industry size and market power."
Undertakings can coordinate their industrial or marketing strategies
in an almost limitless number of illegal ways. They can fix purchase
prices, selling prices, and other contractual conditions, or they can
agree on the allocation of production quotas, sales, customers, and the
relative share of the market.' 6 They can also rig bids in public and pri-
11. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION 209 (1990) (quoting Aesop).
12. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81(1), Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 173, 208 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The Treaty provided,
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market ....
Id.
13. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 11, at 208.
14. Id. at 223-28.
15. Id. at 227.
16. See EC Treaty art. 81(1); see also GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION LAW 155
(2007) ("[U]nder Article 81 certain kinds of agreements are unlawful ... [since] certain types
[Vol. 29:565
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vate auctions, restrict imports and exports, or engage in other anti-
competitive conduct. 7 Each of these types of conduct represents a
"straightforward redistribution of income and capital, on the same ba-
sis as a credit card fraud or a bank robbery."'' 8 Cartels, thus, result in the
misallocation of resources, increased prices for products and services,
the reduction of quality, and a slowing of innovation.' 9 As was color-
fully suggested, the "cartel bear undermines efficiency and ultimately
makes the economy and society poorer."
20
Antitrust agencies may prevent this undesirable outcome by adopting
a preventive approach, a deterrent-punitive approach, or a combination of
the two.2' The method by which antitrust agencies determine the optimum
of agreement would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output."
(citation omitted)).
17. The anticompetitive conduct set forth in Article 81(1) of the E.C. Treaty is not ex-
haustive, and E.U. Member State courts and antitrust agencies, as well as the E.U.
Commission and the E.U. courts, have examined other conduct for possible antitrust viola-
tions. See, e.g., Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (4th ed. 2004).
18. Philip Lowe, Dir. Gen., DG Competition, Eur. Comm'n, Speech at the ICN Annual
Conference 4 (May 31, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/
text/sp2007-06-en.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Botana, supra note 3, at 48; see also Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, Leniency
Programs and Cartel Prosecution, 21 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 347 (2003). A "fourth approach"
to an optimum fining policy exists in the promotion of private enforcement actions. Private
enforcement plays a substantially different role in Europe than it does in the United States. See
Margaret Bloom, Should Foreign Purchasers Have Access to U.S. Antitrust Damages Reme-
dies? A Post-Empagran Perspective from Europe, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 433, 440
(2005). The reason for this lies in the different approaches as to the appropriate balance be-
tween public and private enforcement of antitrust laws. While in Europe, private actions for
damages are complementary to antitrust agency enforcement, the U.S. legal framework over-
whelmingly favors private suits to the point that such suits represent, together with the
provision of criminal sanctions, the core of the antitrust enforcement. Id. at 440-41. The Euro-
pean Union is slowly but deliberately educating the stakeholders involved in antitrust
infringement actions-including national courts-about the likely benefits derived from wider
promotion of private actions for antitrust damages. See Commission White Paper on Damages
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files-white_
paper/ whitepaper.en.pdf; Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper
on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2008) 404 (Apr. 2, 2008),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files-white-
paper/working-paper.pdf; Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Document
to the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Impact Assess-
ment, SEC (2008) 404 (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
antitrust/actionsdamages/files-white-paper/impactjreport.pdf (arguing that a number of
measures facilitating antitrust damages actions would have a beneficial impact on the en-
forcement of antitrust laws in Europe, such as ensuring adequate compensation for victims of
anticompetitive conduct, enhancing deterrence of unlawful conduct, and generating a positive
overall economic effect); Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the
EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://
Spring 2008]
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level of prevention and deterrence leads to substantial differences in
• 22
terms of the nature and level of sanctions. Thus, certain jurisdictions,
such as the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Korea, and Bra-
zil, 3 and, within the European Economic Area (EEA), Austria, Estonia,
France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom, impose
criminal sanctions (including custodial sentences),24 while others, such
as the European Union, merely rely on the threat of monetary or ad-
ministrative sanctions 25
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005 0672en01.pdf (setting out a num-
ber of options to facilitate private antitrust damages actions); Commission Staff Working Paper
Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC
(2005) 1732 (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/
actionsdamages/sp-en.pdf.
22. See WOUTER P.J. WILS, THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW:
ESSAYS IN LAW & ECONOMICS (2002) (providing a comprehensive analysis of antitrust fines,
their contribution to antitrust enforcement, and the problems faced by antitrust agencies in
setting the optimal level of antitrust fines); Wouter P.J. Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory
and Practice, 30 WORLD COMPETITION 25 (2007) [hereinafter Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines]
(containing a detailed analysis of the interplay between leniency programs and fines).
23. See AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
801-07 (6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS].
24. Bloom, supra note 21, at 441; see also Inst. of Competition Law, Antitrust Encyclo-
pedia, available at http://www.concurrences.com/rubrique.php3?id-rubrique=512 (offering an
overview of the nature and level of sanctions for the infringement of antitrust rules in each of
the E.U. Member States). In the U.S. antitrust system, anticompetitive practices that violate
sections two and three of the Sherman Act and sections two and fourteen of the Clayton Act
incur criminal penalties. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 2, 14, 38 Stat. 730, 730, 736 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 24); Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. 209, 209
(1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2-3). However, the majority of criminal prosecu-
tions pursued by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) involve "per se violations of Section 1
[of the Sherman Act], including horizontal price fixing, bid rigging, and market or customer
allocations,' while the other provisions are rarely enforced criminally. ANTITRUST LAW DE-
VELOPMENTS, supra note 23, at 734-35. Individuals convicted under the Sherman Act may be
sentenced to up to ten years imprisonment and fined up to $1 million ($100 million for corpo-
rations). 15 U.S.C § 1, amended by Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215(a), 118 Stat. 661, 668 (2004). Moreover, since the pas-
sage of the Criminal Fine Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987), an
alternative fine of up to twice the defendant's gain, or twice the victims' monetary loss, may
be imposed, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000).
25. See Commission Regulation 1/2003, art. 23(2)(a), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 17 [hereinafter
Commission Regulation 1/20031. The deterrent effect of fines is achieved if, and when, they
make price-fixing unprofitable for an undertaking. Since only roughly ten percent of cartels
are discovered, undertakings decide whether to collude, not on the basis of the nominal fine,
but on the basis of the fine discounted by the probability of being caught and fined-the ex-
pected fine. See Cento Veljanovski, Cartel Fines in Europe: Law Practice and Deterrence, 30
WORLD COMPETITION 65, 81-82 (2007). Thus, for a fine to be a deterrent, it should be multi-
plied by such a factor to cause an expected fine equal to the overall consumer loss. See id.
(concluding that the current E.U. Commission fining system is under-deterrent and that fines
should be, on average, seventeen times higher than those imposed). With the possible under-
deterrence in the E.U. system, the U.S. criminal system might be preferable, as it punishes the
real authors of the antitrust violations and does not expose an undertaking to large fines that
could push it out of the market.
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The E.U. Commission adopted the "combined non-criminal" ap-
proach to antitrust infringement.26 Since her appointment as European
Commissioner for Competition Policy in 2004, Neelie Kroes has iden-
tified cartel-busting as the Commission's priority in its enforcement ofantirust 27
antitrust law. The underlying Commission strategy is based on the
synergy created by the joint application of the Guidelines on the
Method of Setting Fines 28 and the Leniency Notice. 29 The rationale be-
hind the Commission's strategy is that an antitrust system based only,
or predominantly, on preventive mechanisms, based on the economic
analysis of publicly available data or information provided by third
parties, would be excessively expensive and often impractical. 30 By the
same token, a purely deterrent system would be simply inefficient, be-
cause no fine can restore the loss to the consumer or remedy the harm
26. See Commission Regulation 1/2003, supra note 25, arts. 23-24; see also Neelie
Kroes, Competition Commn'r, Reinforcing the Fight Against Cartels and Developing Private
Antitrust Damage Actions: Two Tools for a More Competitive Europe, Commission/IBA Joint
Conference on EC Competition Policy, Brussels, speech/07/128 (Mar. 8, 2007) (explaining
that "the most visible deterrent signal we are sending out is through our fines"). The synergies
derived from the combination of a preventive and deterrent approach were further strength-
ened by the adoption, in 2006, of the New Leniency Notice and the new Guidelines on the
Method of Setting Fines. See discussion infra Part II.B. The new Guidelines have been
strongly criticized as unreasonably raising the average level of fines. See Veljanovski, supra
note 25, at 85 (concluding that the new method of setting fines is unsatisfactory, as the result-
ing level of fines "do[es] not reflect the harm caused by cartels ... nor [is it] likely to deter
price-fixing"). Some also suggest that, compared to systems with mere administrative fines,
such as the European Union, the threat of criminal sanctions and individual criminal liability
strengthens the effectiveness of leniency programs. This is so because individuals are incentiv-
ized to disclose a cartel since they are exposed, not only to a monetary loss, but also to a loss
which is not reimbursable by their companies, such as freedom and reputation. See R. Hewitt
Pate, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Int'l Anti-Cartel Enforcement,
Address Before the ICN Cartels Workshop 12-13 (Nov. 21, 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206428.pdf.
27. See Neelie Kroes, Competition Comm'r, EC Antitrust Rules: An Overview of Re-
cent Developments, Speech Held Before the Hellenic Competition Commission, Athens,
speech/06/566 (Oct. 5, 2006).
28. Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of
Regulation No. 1/2003, 2006 O.J. (C 210) 2.
29. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2; see also Kroes, supra note 26. In fine-tuning
the interplay between preventive and deterrent mechanisms, the E.U. Commission did not
follow the U.S. view that leniency or amnesty programs associated with the threat of criminal
sanctions and imprisonment for executives are arguably more effective than those associated
with mere monetary sanctions. See Botana, supra note 3, at 49.
30. See Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines, supra note 22, at 39. The cost-benefit analysis
applied to regulated markets is slightly different. The existence of regulatory mechanisms has
a double effect: on the one hand, it assures the availability of a comprehensive set of market
data and constant monitoring of the industry; on the other hand, it diminishes the need for
antitrust interventions, as anticompetitive conduct is less likely to occur.
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to competition, 3' and companies may, nonetheless, find participation in
a cartel profitable.32
Alternatively, an antitrust system characterized by an adequate leni-
ency program and sufficiently deterrent monetary sanctions is likely to
result in the disclosure of existing secret cartels, the detection and pun-
ishment of a greater number of undertakings, and the prevention of
future anticompetitive conduct.33 Combined with these benefits is the
reduction of the relative cost of public enforcement of the antitrust rules
for each individual infringement.34
II. THE E.U. LENIENCY PROGRAM
Socrates: [Tell] me whether you think that a city, or an army, or
a band of robbers or thieves, or any other company which pur-
sue some unjust end in common, would be able to effect anything
if they were unjust to one another?
Thrasymachus: Of course not ....
Socrates: [When] we say that any vigorous joint action is the
work of unjust men, our language is not altogether accurate. If
they had been thoroughly unjust, they could not have kept their
hands off one another. Clearly, they must have possessed justice
of a sort, enough to keep them from exercising their injustice on
each other at the same time as on their victims. For the thorough
31. See Veljanovski, supra note 25, at 79-80. It is noticeable that in the European Un-
ion, unlike in the United States, antitrust fines reflect neither the gain reaped by the violator
nor the loss suffered by the victim; rather, the fine is a function of the gravity and duration of
the infringement, as well as of a number of aggravating and attenuating circumstances detailed
in the Commission's Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines. See generally id. Some au-
thors define the E.U. fining system as arbitrary, and note that a large fine may have downside
effects that should be carefully considered. For example, a fine can be so high as to infringe
the general principles of E.U. law, such as proportionality. In extreme, but nevertheless realis-
tic, cases, a very high fine can cause an undertaking to go bankrupt. See id. at 85 (noting that a
pure deterrent fining system also faces more practical problems, namely, "the firm's ability of
the firms to pay, the enforcement costs, and their political and public acceptability"); see also
Motta & Polo, supra note 21.
32. See Veljanovski, supra note 25, at 80-81. While the duration of the infringement is
a critical factor in determining the fine, as the fine cannot exceed ten percent of the company's
turnover, the deterrent effect of the duration factor in the calculation of the fine will be obvi-
ated in circumstances when the undertaking has already reached that ten percent ceiling. See
Commission Regulation 1/2003, supra note 25, art. 23(2)(a).
33. Motta & Polo, supra note 21, at 349.
34. See Giancarlo Spagnolo, Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust 9-10 (Ctr. for
Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 5794, 2006), available at www.cepr.org/
pubs/dps/DP5794.asp.
[Vol. 29:565
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villains who are perfectly unjust, are also perfectly incapable of
action.35
The E.U. Leniency Program is "by far the most important investiga-
tive tool in the fight against cartels."3 6 It is a "key measure for the
European Commission"'" and an opportunity for companies who are
party to a secret cartel to disclose their illegal conduct to the E.U. Com-
mission in exchange for immunity from, or a reduction of, the fine
otherwise imposed for the violation of anti-cartel laws.3"
The critical factor in the race to immunity is the point in time at
which the undertaking submits documentary evidence to the Commis-
sion.39 Only the first undertaking to cooperate with the Commission is
granted immunity.4° In particular, the Commission
will grant immunity from any fine which would otherwise have
been imposed to an undertaking disclosing its participation in an
alleged cartel affecting the Community if that undertaking is the
first to submit information and evidence which in the Commis-
sion's view will enable it to:
(a) carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the alleged
cartel; or
(b) find an infringement of Article 81 EC in connection with the
alleged cartel.4'
In order to qualify for a reduction of a fine, an undertaking "must
provide the Commission with evidence of the alleged infringement
which represents significant added value with respect to the evidence
already in the Commission's possession and must meet the cumulative
conditions set out [in the Notice].'
The Leniency Program relies on a Trojan horse strategy. Through the
complicity of the cartel members, it exploits the weaknesses inherent in
the same collusive conduct that it seeks to control. Each member of a
35. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 11, at 211 (quoting Plato).
36. Submission by the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commis-
sion, supra note 6, at 3.
37. Olivier Guersent, The Fight Against Secret Horizontal Agreement in the EC Compe-
tition Policy, in 2003 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE:
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 45 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2004).
38. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, TT 4-5. Consistent with previous Leniency
Notices, the New Leniency Notice distinguishes between immunity from, and reduction of,
fines. Id.
39. See id. [ 8.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. 24.
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cartel is tempted to cheat on the cartel agreement, and thus gain higher
profits, by, for example, increasing the output or cutting the cartel's
price. 43 This inherent instability of cartels, and the related difficulty in
the enforcement of the cartel arrangements," is the major cause of their
failure .5
The Leniency Program takes advantage of the inherent instability of
cartels by increasing the incentives for a member to cheat on the cartel
arrangement.46 More specifically, the rationale of the Leniency Program
is twofold: first, it creates a "race for immunity," so that the first under-
taking to provide the Commission with inside information on the cartel
is granted full immunity from fines, while the undertakings that follow
may only be granted a reduction of the fine 7; second, "the mere appre-
hension that a member of a cartel might go to the authorities and secure
immunity tends to destabilize the activity of the cartel itself."
4
Absent the Leniency Program, the likelihood that cartel members
would spontaneously stop colluding is low. In fact, assuming that all car-
tel members find compliance with the cartel arrangement profitable-
i.e., nobody cheats-there would be little reason for an undertaking to
terminate its participation in the collusive practices. One reason for ter-
mination may be a change in the undertaking's management, where the
new managers are risk-averse. In this case, the new executives might
adopt a corporate policy of full compliance with the law-even if the
company ought to forego the "extra" gain from the cartel. Also, absent
the incentives of a leniency program, when government antitrust agen-
cies announce the launch of a sector inquiry, undertakings may cease
collusion because of an increased risk of detection.
43. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 11, at 223-28. Each member of the cartel has
different incentives to cheat on the agreed price or output, and not all members may find de-
viation or cheating profitable. For example, a firm tends to lower prices in order to increase
sales if it sustained high fixed costs due to the construction of a new plant not long before the
formation of the cartel and has substantial unutilized capacity. However, if a firm operates at
full capacity, it has no incentive to cheat on the output arrangements.
44. Id. The enforcement of cartels involves substantial monitoring costs, and its success
depends on several factors, including reliable methods of detecting and punishing cheating.
45. Id. The likelihood that a cartel will succeed is low when its members decide to
cheat, even if the market is characterized by a small number of firms trading in homogeneous
products with little substitutability, an inelastic demand curve, and no threat of entry.
46. Id. at 159. The Leniency Program exploits the dynamics of game theory and recre-
ates a prisoner's dilemma pattern, in which deviation is more profitable than collusion, but the
full gain is available only to one colluder. See id. (providing an analysis of the game theory);
Botana, supra note 3, at 57.
47. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 8, 23.
48. Phillip Lowe, Dir. Gen., DG Competition, Eur. Comm'n, What's the Future of Car-
tel Enforcement, Presentation to Understanding Global Cartel Enforcement Conference 3
(Feb. 11, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eulcommlcompetitionlspeeches/textlsp2003-
044_en.pdf.
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However, from an antitrust policy viewpoint, the situations in which
an undertaking terminates its collusive conduct due to the objective
benefits of the Leniency Program differ substantially from situations in
which the termination is driven by the risk aversion of management.
Only in the former case does the termination of collusion allow public
agencies to uncover the infringement to its full extent and to punish all
of the cartel members. However, in the latter case, there is no such out-
come, since termination takes place secretly because an undertaking
would otherwise face a substantial fine.49
A. The E. U. Leniency Program and the New Leniency Notice
Since its introduction in 1996, the Commission's Leniency Program
has been the most effective tool in the Commission's fight against car-
tels. 0 The Program allowed the E.U. antitrust agency to initiate several
investigations into a number of industries, to dismantle secret cartels,
and to punish a large number of undertakings.'
In 2002, the E.U. Commission published a revised version of the
Leniency Notice, 2 which has been even more successful than its prede-
cessor. Since the 2002 Leniency Notice entered into force, 167
companies have filed applications for immunity from, or a reduction of,
fines.5 3 In only fifty-one cases did the Commission grant conditional
immunity, while twenty-three applications were either rejected or not
considered further. 4
On December 8, 2006, with four years of experience in applying the
2002 Leniency Notice, and in line with the European Competition
49. Moreover, undertakings still face the risk of investigation and subsequent punish-
ment, at least until the infringement is prescribed. See Francois Arbault & Francisco Peir6,
The Commission's New Notice on Immunity and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases: Building
on Success, COMPETITION POCY NEWSL. (Competition Directorate-Gen. of the Eur. Comm'n,
Brussels, Belg.), June 2002, at 15, 19.
50. Guersent, supra note 37, at 45; see also Lowe, supra note 48, at 3.
51. Under the 1996 Leniency Program, approximately 100 companies filed applications
for immunity or a reduction of fines, and, by October 2004, the Commission had issued
twenty-eight formal decisions in cartel cases in which companies had cooperated under the
Leniency Program. See Bloom, supra note 21, at 438 (citing Guersent, supra note 37, at 45).
52. Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel
Cases, 2002 O.J. (C 45) 3 [hereinafter 2002 Leniency Notice].
53. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Competition: Commission Proposes Changes to the
Leniency Notice-Frequently Asked Questions I (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/357&format=PDF&aged= 1 &
language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
54. See id. at 1-2. In particular, the Commission received eighty-seven applications for
immunity and eighty applications for a reduction of the fine. Id. at 1. Besides the fifty-one
conditional immunities and the twenty-three rejections or decisions not to consider further, the
Commission either found that the Leniency applicants did not meet the immunity threshold or
transferred the case to a national authority. Id.
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Network's Model Leniency Program,55 the Commission adopted the New
Leniency Notice.56 The purpose of this new Notice was to further
strengthen the effectiveness of the Leniency Program by providing
undertakings with more comprehensive information and assistance in
filing Leniency applications 7 Although criticism of the New Leniency
Notice exists, 51 the 2006 New Leniency Notice introduced several
innovations that made the disclosure of infringement, and subsequent
cooperation with the Commission, more attractive to price-fixers.
Among the innovations is the introduction of a "marker," which al-
lows undertakings to preserve their position in the Leniency ranking 9
An undertaking that applies for a marker has to provide much less in-
formation than necessary for a standard application for immunity.60 If the
undertaking then supplements its application with information about the
infringement within a certain period of time, the application is deemed
filed as of the date of the marker.6' Also, the New Leniency Notice
55. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Competition: Commission and Other ECN Mem-
bers Co-operate in Use of Leniency to Fight Cross Border Cartels (Sept. 26, 2006), available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1288&format=PDF&aged=
I &language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
56. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2.
57. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Competition: Commission Adopts Revised Leni-
ency Notice to Reward Companies that Report Cartels (Dec. 7, 2006), available at
http://europa.eulrapid/pressReleasesAction.doreference=IP/06/1705&format=PDF&aged= 1
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. The 2002 Leniency Notice did not provide the same de-
gree of assistance in terms of what information should be provided by an undertaking to
qualify for immunity. The lack of assistance appears to be a major cause of the high number of
rejected applications and delay in processing the admitted ones. See Press Release, Eur.
Comm'n, Competition: Commission and Other ECN Members Co-operate in Use of Leniency
to Fight Cross Border Cartels, supra note 55, at 1. As the Competition Commissioner, Neelie
Kroes, stated,
Secret cartels undermine healthy economic activity. To root out cartels we need
heavy sanctions to deter cartels and an efficient leniency policy providing incentives
to report them. These changes will further strengthen the effectiveness of the Com-
mission's leniency programme in the detection of cartels and offer clearer guidance
for business.
Id.
58. See Comments Received, Eur. Comm'n, Pub. Consultation on Amendment of the
Leniency Notice (Oct. 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eucomm/competition/cartels/
legislation/leniencyconsultation.html; Veljanovski, supra note 25, at 85 (concluding that the
current fine structure is "unsatisfactory").
59. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, In 14-15.
60. Compare id. (application for a marker), with id. T 16 (application for formal immu-
nity).
61. Id. Unlike the U.S. leniency program, the New Leniency Notice did not introduce
the concept of "amnesty plus"-better termed, perhaps, "penalty plus"-which allows under-
takings that do not qualify for leniency in an on-going investigation to disclose the existence
of a second cartel. See generally U.S. Dep't of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy (Aug. 10,
1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm. If the undertaking
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adopted an ad hoc administrative procedure to protect the Leniency
documents in the Commission's file, and, in particular, the corporate
statements .62
Overall, the new Leniency Notice improved the program in two
ways: by providing new incentives for undertakings to cooperate with
the E.U. Commission, and by guaranteeing greater protection for the
confidential corporate submissions.63
B. Information Provided Under the New Leniency
Notice and the Evidentiary Value of the Corporate Statements
The New Leniency Notice defines the notion of "evidence" to in-
clude corporate statements in "the form of written documents signed by
or on behalf of the undertaking or... made orally" and "other evidence
relating to the alleged cartel in possession of the applicant or available to
it at the time of the submission."'
cooperates in the second investigation, it can receive leniency for the second offense as well as
a substantial reduction in the fine for its participation in the first infringement. The "amnesty
plus" normally leads to a snowball effect because undertakings, by disclosing other cartels
related to different product markets, are also granted advantages in relation to the first product
for which they failed to qualify for immunity. See Bertus Van Barlingen, The European
Commission's 2002 Leniency Notice After One Year of Operation, COMPETITION POI'Y
NEWSL. (Competition Directorate-Gen. of the Eur. Comm'n, Brussels, Belg.),
Summer 2003, at 16, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/
cpn2003-2.pdf. The result obtained through "amnesty plus" can be compensated only partially
through the strategy currently used by undertakings subject to an inspection. Such undertak-
ings consider whether to disclose any other cartels as soon as possible, at least for neighboring
product markets, and thus obtain an important advantage in terms of time over the other par-
ticipants of the same cartel. In particular, this practice does not benefit the undertaking with
respect to the first proceeding-i.e., the one in which the undertaking was not granted immu-
nity. See Mark Jephcott, The European Commission's New Leniency Notice-Whistling the
Right Tune, 23 E.C.L.R. 378, 381 (2002) (commenting on "amnesty plus"); Donal McElwee,
Should the European Commission Adopt "Amnesty Plus" in Its Fight Against Hardcore Car-
tels?, 25 E.C.L.R. 558 (2004) (same).
62. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 31-33.
63. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Competition: Commission Adopts Revised Leniency
Notice to Reward Companies that Report Cartels (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1705&format=HTML&aged--0&language=EN
&guiLanguage=en.
64. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 9(a) n.2, 9(b). The New Leniency Notice,
similar to the 2002 Leniency Notice, abandoned the distinction adopted by the 1996 Leniency
Notice between "information, documents or other evidence." Commission Notice, supra note
1, 1 D(I); cf New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 9 (omitting the distinction). The New
Leniency Notice, however, identifies three categories of evidence for the purpose of establish-
ing the degree of collaboration of the undertakings: the first is "evidence contemporaneous to
the infringement." New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 1 9-11. It recognizes that evidence
formed at the time of the infringement is, by its very nature, more reliable than that which
came into existence after, and thus deserves special consideration. The second category of
evidence refers to the concept of "significant added value." Id. 24. The New Leniency Notice
requires, inter alia, that in order to qualify for the reduction of the fine, undertakings must
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Corporate statements are evaluative documents in which the under-
taking describes the functioning of the cartel based on its own
participation. Such statements differ from all other documents that an
undertaking may provide to the Commission, such as minutes of corpo-
rate meetings, agreements, emails, and any other kind of corporate
record or information classified as "pre-existing documents."66 Corporate
statements are submissions voluntarily provided to the Commission that
did not exist prior to the administrative proceedings and that were pre-
pared solely for submission in the Leniency Program.67 They cannot be
"found" by the Commission during a dawn-raid, and are distinct from
the statements released by the company in answering the Commission's
traditional requests for information.
Corporate statements have great evidentiary value, especially in car-
68tel cases, in which the probability that the Commission will find a
"smoking gun" is extremely low, as undertakings typically develop com-
plex and fine-tuned techniques to keep their collusion secret. 69 The
European Court of First Instance (CFI) has recognized the evidentiary
nature of corporate statements, stating that "no provision or any general
principle of the Community law prohibits the Commission from relying,
as against an undertaking, on statements made by other incriminated un-
dertakings ... .70 As discussed in Part III, a problem arises from these
provide evidence that has a "significant added value" with respect to the evidence already in
the Commission's possession. Id. It identifies the notion of "added value" as "the extent to
which the evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature and/or its level of detail, the
Commission's ability to prove the alleged cartel." Id. 25. Similar to a gap found in the 2002
Leniency Notice, the New Leniency Notice lacks guidance as to when such "added value"
must be considered "significant." See Bertus Van Barlingen & Marc Barennes, The European
Commission's 2002 Leniency Notice in Practice, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. (Competition
Directorate-Gen. of the Eur. Comm'n, Brussels, Belg.), Autumn 2005, at 13-14. Finally, the
New Leniency Notice, for the first time, introduced the concept of "compelling evidence" as
evidence that "will be attributed a greater value than evidence such as statements which re-
quire corroboration if contested." New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 25. This new
distinction will likely generate further confusion and will lower the attractiveness of the pro-
gram, as an undertaking will cooperate with the Commission only if it can expect an adequate
chance of being granted a reduction of the fine.
65. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 1 9.
66. Id. 7 6.
67. Id. $ 31.
68. See Van Barlingen & Barennes, supra note 64, at 9.
69. Id.
70. Joined Cases T-67, 68, 71, & 78/00, JFE Eng'g Corp. v. Commission, 2004 E.C.R.
11-2501, 1-2587. The problem often associated with the corporate statements is determining
whether, and to what extent, the Commission may rely on corporate statements that are either
unsupported by other evidence or contradicted by submissions from other members of the
cartel. In JFE Engineering, the Court of First Instance (CFI) stated that ". . . an admission by
one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the accuracy of which is contested
by several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate
proof of an infringement committed by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence." Id.
[Vol. 29:565
The E. U. Leniency Program
corporate statements in connection with the broad interpretation of U.S.
federal civil discovery rules, which leaves open the question of whether
the defendant is required to produce everything in her possession or cus-
tody, or everything under her control.7 ' As the second view is the
prevailing one, a Leniency applicant must produce, among other things,
a copy of the Leniency application, which includes the corporate state-
ments.
C. The Discoverability of Corporate Statements
Under the Leniency Notice
The New Leniency Notice acknowledges and warns that discovery
of Leniency documents is likely to impair the position of Leniency ap-
plicants in civil actions for damages relative to those undertakings that
do not cooperate with the E.U. Commission. In turn, this situation
would harm the public interest of the Commission in enforcing antitrust
rules .7 3
All of the information provided by undertakings in the Leniency
Program, including the corporate statements, form the Commission's
administrative file and are covered by the general rule of professional
secrecy. 4 The Commission may use the information solely for the pur-
pose for which the information was gathered, and must not disclose it to
third parties.75
at IH-2595. The evidentiary value of the oral statements has also been recognized by the Euro-
pean courts. In Graphite Electrodes, a case analyzed under the 1996 Leniency Notice, the CFI
clarified that "... the Leniency Notice states that not only 'documents' but also 'information'
may serve as 'evidence' which materially contributed to establishing the existence of the in-
fringement. It follows that the information need not necessarily be provided in documentary
form." Joined Cases T-236, 239, 244-246, 251, & 252/01, Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. v. Comm'n
(Graphite Electrodes), 2004 E.C.R. 11-1181, 11-1336. In practice, the distinction between sup-
ported and unsupported-by other evidence-statements is not crystal clear, and
undertakings-especially those that could not access the Leniency Program-face a greater
risk that the whistleblower might have embellished the story with the aim of gaining immu-
nity.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(b).
72. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 6.
73. /d.
74. See EC Treaty art. 287; Commission Regulation 1/2003, supra note 25, art. 28;
Council Regulation 259/68 Laying Down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions
of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and Instituting Special
Measures Temporarily Applicable to Officials of the Commission, art. 17, 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED.
(L 56) 1, (European Economic Community, European Atomic Emergency Community, Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community).
75. Submission by the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commis-
sion, supra note 6, at 4-5.
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It should be noted that third-party claimants have no access to the
Commission's file or any documents therein. 7 6 It follows that the only
risk of Leniency document disclosure comes from the possibility that a
party to the administrative proceeding may be compelled to produce theS • 77
content of their Leniency application. There is also a distinction be-
tween the generality of the documents in the Commission's file and the
corporate statements.78 The Commission will only transmit a corporate
statement
... to the competition authorities of the Member States pursuant
to Article 12 of Regulation No 1/2003, provided that the condi-
tions set out in the Network Notice are met and that the level of
protection against disclosure awarded by the receiving competi-
tion authority is equivalent to the one conferred by the
Commission.79
Furthermore, the Commission
may refuse to transmit information to national courts for reasons
relating to the need to safeguard the interests of the Community
or to avoid any interference with its functioning and independ-
ence, in particular by jeopardizing the accomplishment of the
tasks entrusted to it.80
Thus, without the consent of a Leniency applicant, the Commission will
not transmit information to a national court voluntarily submitted by that
applicant.8s
While pre-existing documents, which are the most conspicuous part
of the Commission's file, are discoverable without constraint," the New
76. See Commission Notice on the Rules for Access to the Commission File in Cases
Pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement
and Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, 30-32, 2005 O.J. (C 325) 7, 12 [hereinafter
Commission Notice on the Rules for Access to the Commission File]; see also id. 3, at 7
("The term access to the file is used in this notice exclusively to mean the access granted to
the persons, undertakings or association of undertakings to whom the Commission has ad-
dressed a statement of objections.").
77. As discussed infra Part l.C, even if the defendant claims that none of the Leniency
documents are in her possession-perhaps because she filed an oral leniency-it is likely that
she may, nonetheless, be compelled to produce the documents anyway because she can re-
quest the Leniency documents from the Commission.
78. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, T 9.
79. Id. [35.
80. Commission Notice on the Co-operation Between the Commission and the Courts
of the EU Member States in the Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, 26, 2004 O.J. (C 101)
54, 58.
81. Id.
82. But see New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 40 ("The Commission considers that
normally public disclosure of documents and written or recorded statements received in the
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Leniency Notice sets forth specific rules regarding access to corporate
83
statements. In particular, it entitles only the addressees of the statement
of objections to access the corporate statements.84 Other parties, such as
third-party complainants, are denied access.85 The parties who have ac-
cess to these statements are prohibited from making a mechanical copy
of the documents, and the information that they obtain may be used
solely "for the purposes of judicial or administrative proceedings for the
application of the Community competition rules at issue in the related
administrative proceedings.
86
This provision, however, while shedding light on a critical, often
overlooked, issue, is not entirely unequivocal in the law. It clearly refers
to the administrative proceedings before the Commission and the judicial
enforcement of the antitrust rules before the CFI and the European Court
of Justice (ECJ). Yet, private actions for damages in civil courts of the
E.U. Member States simply represent a different-complementary-way
to enforce competition rules. Accordingly, the provisions of the Leniency
Notice are not an absolute ban on a third-party claimant's request for
discovery of the Leniency application or of use of it as evidence in a
civil action for damages.87 While true in principle, as a matter of practice,
the possibility for discovery of the Leniency documents for use in private
enforcement of E.U. antitrust law is currently limited to England and
Wales. 8 None of the other E.U. Member States provides litigants with as
powerful a tool as discovery of these documents.
context of this notice would undermine certain public or private interests, for example the
protection of the purpose of inspections and investigations.
83. Id. T 33.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. 9I9T 33, 34. This particularly high level of protection of the corporate statements is
secure as long as the Leniency applicant does not disclose their contents. Id. 91 33.
87. See Commission Regulation 1/2003, supra note 25, art. 16 (granting Commission
decisions binding precedential effect in Member State courts).
88. With reference to the private enforcement of antitrust law in the United Kingdom, it
is worth mentioning the recent judgment by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in Emer-
son Elec. Co. v. Morgan Crucible Co. [2007] CAT 28 (U.K.). In Emerson Electric, the
claimants brought an action against Morgan Crucible, a member of a graphite cartel that had
filed a Leniency application with the E.U. Commission and was granted immunity from fines.
Id. 9% 12, 17; see also Commission Decision of 3 December 2003 Relating to a Proceeding
Under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, 9 13, 2004 O.J. (L
125) 45 (granting Morgan Crucible immunity for being the first undertaking to report the
cartel). One issue before the tribunal was whether a damages action could proceed against the
member of a cartel while appeals against the E.U. Commission's decision, brought by other
cartel members, were pending before the CFI. Id. Emerson Elec. Co., [2007] CAT 28, at
99 49-50. The CAT had ruled previously that claimants seeking to recover antitrust damages
from a Leniency applicant need to obtain permission from the tribunal in order to proceed
with the claim. Id. 66. On November 16, 2007, the CAT permitted the claim to proceed,
finding that a further delay in the discovery process could compromise the future availability
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With the aim to frustrate motions to compel discovery of the Leni-
ency submissions, the New Leniency Notice permits undertakings to
submit oral corporate statements.89 In practice, corporate executives ap-
pear at the Commission's offices and dictate to the officials all that they
know about the infringement.' The Commission records the speech and
transcribes it to allow the undertaking to check its accuracy.9' Although
providing the undertaking with a written copy of the oral submissions
could subvert the purpose of the oral procedure,92 checking the transcript
is fundamental to avoiding potential challenges or litigation over the
most important evidence of the infringement.
93
The oral leniency procedure can frustrate any future discovery re-
quest, as the undertaking is given no copy of the transcript for its
personal file, and the U.S. civil courts should consider the transcripts to
be working documents of the Commission's officials. Some commenta-
tors, however, argue that the documents are still under the control of the
undertaking, since the latter has the right to request them from the
Commission.94 Accordingly, a U.S. court could order the undertaking to
obtain a copy of the documents from the Commission.95
The anti-discovery goals pursued by the Commission in its oral leni-
ency procedure may be frustrated, moreover, by its own administrative
practice of statements of objections.96 Parties to administrative proceed-
ings receive a written version of the statement of objections in which the
Commission supports its findings by quoting relevant portions of corpo-
rate statements provided by Leniency applicants.97 Hence, although the
of certain documents. Emerson Elec. Co., [2007] CAT 28 at 17. The ruling is particularly
relevant not only for the likely negative impact on the efficient enforcement of the Leniency
Program, which could derive from the unlimited and unconstrained discovery of evidence
regarding an infringement for which there is an outstanding appeal, but also the joint and
several liability for antitrust infringements. Id. 15.
89. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 32.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Because, at that point, the undertaking not only has control over the documents, but,
arguably, materially possesses them.
93. See New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, T 32 (stating that noncompliance with the
requirement to the accuracy of the transcript "may lead to the loss of any beneficial treatment
under th[e] Notice").
94. See Nordlander, supra note 5, at 657-58.
95. Moreover, the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) contain other pro-
visions that can frustrate the bans of, and limits to, the discovery of the Commission's file set
forth in the New Leniency Notice, such as depositions and interrogatories. See discussion
infra Part HIl.
96. Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 10, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18 (setting forth the
obligation of the E.U. Commission to issue a statement of objection in proceedings for in-
fringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty).
97. See Submission by the Directorate General for Competition of the European Com-
mission, supra note 6, at 4.
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oral submissions are not discoverable as documents, their content may
be disclosed in a document-the statement of objections-that eventu-
ally may be provided to the statement's addressees and, in a non-
confidential version, to third-party claimants that join the Commission's
proceedings. 98 The Commission, aware of the adverse effect of this prac-
tice, began replacing the verbatim quotations of corporate statements
with a summary of their contents.99 In any event, the statement of objec-
tions continues to be subject to discovery. Accordingly, the guarantees
provided by oral leniency are temporally limited, since they "expire" as
soon as the Commission serves the members of a cartel with the state-
ment of objections.' °° At that point, it is difficult to deny discovery on
the basis of the provisions of the New Leniency Notice, since the cartel
members physically possess the statement of objections and, thus, are
deemed to have control over it. Comity then remains the only defense
available to the defendant seeking to avoid discovery of the corporate
statements.
Finally, there are at least two methods that could frustrate the in-
tended limit in the New Leniency Notice to discovery of the
Commission's file. First, the power of the U.S. federal courts to order the
production of certain documents is not limited by foreign laws or
"blocking statutes"-including the new Leniency Notice-that prohibit
disclosure.' ° ' Second, even if corporate statements are not available, a
plaintiff could still serve a notice of deposition on the management or em-
ployees of the Leniency applicant under Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of
98. So far, it appears that there is no alternative way for the statement of objections to
provide the Commission's position regarding a possible infringement to persons or undertak-
ings before adopting a decision that negatively affects their rights. The Commission's
obligation to issue a statement of objections derives from the addressee's right of defense,
which requires that they be given the opportunity to make their position known regarding any
objection that the Commission may make. Commission Regulation 773/2004, supra note 96.
Also, note that the addressees of the statement of objections have no access to the parties'
replies to the statement of objections. See Commission Notice on the Rules for Access to the
Commission File, supra note 76, 27.
99. See Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 Relating to a Proceeding Under Arti-
cle 81(1) of the EC Treaty, 2006 O.J. (L 353) 45 (Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2-Raw Tobacco
Italy) [hereinafter Raw Tobacco Italy]; Commission Decision of 21 December 2005 Relating
to a Proceeding Under Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, 2006 O.J. (L 353) 50 (Case No COMP/F/C.38.443-
Rubber Chemicals) [hereinafter E. U. Rubber Chemicals].
100. Note, also, that the Commission's proceedings may last from one to several years,
making it impossible to predict the duration of the oral leniency "guarantee" against potential
motions to compel discovery.
101. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 544 n.29 (1987); see also discussion infra Part II.
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Civil Procedure (the Rules), or an interrogatory under Rule 33, seeking the
information provided to the Commission in the Leniency procedure.'0 2
D. Noncompliance with the New Leniency Notice's
Provisions on Discoverability
As discussed in Part II(D), the New Leniency Notice provides that
information obtained from the Commission's file may be used only for
the purposes of judicial or administrative proceedings applying the
European Community's competition rules.' 3 Using the corporate state-
ments in a different manner during a proceeding could be regarded as a
lack of cooperation, and it may cause the undertaking to lose the advan-
tages that it obtained under the program.' °' If any alternative use is made
after the Commission has adopted its final decision, "the Commission
may, in any legal proceedings before the Community Courts, ask the
Court to increase the fine in respect of the responsible undertaking."'0 ' If
the illegal disclosure or use of the Leniency documents involved an ex-
ternal counsel, the Commission may solicit the bar of that counsel to
take disciplinary action. 6 As stated by the European Commission Direc-
torate-General for Competition (DG COMP), "documents obtained from
the European Commission by means of access to [the Commission's]
file, may not be used for any other purpose, may not be disclosed and are
to be preserved from disclosure and/or discovery procedures."' 7
E. Commission Regulation on Settlement Procedure
in Cartel Cases
In June 2008, the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No.
622/2008, which provides-for the first time in Europe-a settlement
procedure in cartel cases.'0 8 The purpose of the settlement procedure is to
minimize those costs and resources utilized in investigating potential
violations of Article 81 of the E.C. Treaty, thereby reaching greater effi-
102. See Nordlander, supra note 5, at 658.
103. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 34.
104. See Raw Tobacco Italy, supra note 99, 9.3.1 (revoking immunity granted to Del-
tafina under the 2002 Leniency Notice because the company disclosed its collaboration with
the Commission to third parties).
105. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 34.
106. Id.
107. See Submission by the Directorate General for Competition of the European Com-
mission, supra note 6, at 5.
108. Commission Regulation 622/2008, Amending Regulation 773/2004 as Regards the
Conduct of Settlement Procedures in Cartel Cases, 2008 O.J. (L 171) 3 [hereinafter Settlement
Regulation]; see also Commission Notice on the Conduct of Settlement Procedures in View of
the Adoption of Decisions Pursuant to Article 7 and 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No.
1/2003 in Cartel Cases, 2008 O.J. (C 167) 1 [hereinafter Notice on Settlement Conduct].
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ciency in terms of timely punishment, deterrence, and reduction of fol-
low-on litigation. °9 The procedure enables undertakings subject to cartel
investigations to engage in settlement discussions with the Commis-
sion"" and to acknowledge their involvement and liability for actions in
the cartel"' in exchange for a ten percent reduction in the fine.'
2
The settlement agreement is not an alternative to the Leniency Pro-
gram."3 In fact, the Notice on Settlement Conduct states that the two
procedures may apply to the same conduct and within the same proceed-
ing. ' 4 The benefits that may be awarded under the two procedures are
cumulative, provided that the conditions required by each are satisfied.'"
5
However, the settlement procedure may not lead to negotiation as to
the existence of the infringement, or the appropriate sanction, and a final
decision establishing liability for infringement of E.U. antitrust law is
issued in every case.' 6 From the point of view of an undertaking subject
to cartel investigations, the settlement procedure may lead to substantial
benefits, such as: (i) minimization of the time and costs associated with
the administrative procedure; (ii) a ten percent reduction in the fine;
(iii) the possibility of coupling this reduction with the benefits derived
from a Leniency application; and (iv) the chance to influence the Com-
mission's decision in a more effective fashion than that which is
available through the "standard" procedure.
The Settlement Regulation provides the chance to submit oral set-
tlements-subject to the same procedure provided by the New Leniency
Notice for oral Leniency' 17-and protects the settlement submissions in
exactly the same way that the New Leniency Notice protects the corpo-
rate statements. ' 8 In particular, access to the settlement submissions is
granted only to the addressees of the statement of objections who have
not requested settlement, and these submissions may only be used "for
the purposes of judicial or administrative proceedings for the application
109. Notice on Settlement Conduct, supra note 108, T 1.
110. Id.
111. Id. 20.
112. Id. 32.
113. Id. .
114. Id.
115. Id. IN 1, 33. Note, also, that if an undertaking applies for immunity from, or a re-
duction of, fines after the time limit set by the Commission for the settlement procedure, the
Commission may disregard the application. Id. T 13.
116. Id. H2,3.
117. Id. [38.
118. Compare id. 35, with New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 33 (setting forth the
same limited access to settlement submissions and corporate statements, respectively).
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of the Community competition rules at issue in the related proceed-
ings."119
III. THE DISCOVERY RULES OF THE U.S. FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The application of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the
discovery of Leniency documents is not straightforward. Since the
United States is one of the signatory countries to the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters,' 20 when the
discovery of evidence located abroad is at issue, the threshold issue is
whether the plaintiff must follow the procedures set forth in the Hague
Convention or those set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2'
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa (Aerospatiale). The Court determined that, where a
district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, "the Hague Conven-
tion procedures for the taking of evidence are not the exclusive means
for discovery."23 According to the Supreme Court, the Hague Convention
procedures aim to "facilitate the transmission and execution of Letters of
Request" and "improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commer-
cial matters.' 24 These procedures are not mandatory, and the application
of the principle of international comity compels a balancing of the inter-
ests of the foreign nation and the United States. 25 The Court did not,
119. Id. $ 35; see also id. 36-40 (describing other procedures that restrict access to
information in settlement submissions).
120. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The
general purpose of the Hague Convention is to provide the party initiating the proceeding with
a tool equivalent to that available to it in its domestic jurisdiction. See James P. Springer, An
Overview of International Evidence and Asset Gathering in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, 22
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 277, 313 (1989). Moreover, the Hague Convention aims to
ensure that discovery closely adapts to the practices and procedures of the requesting sover-
eign, so that the evidence obtained will be usable in the requesting State. Id. at 314.
121. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) ("We therefore decline to hold as a blanket matter that comity
requires resort to Hague Evidence Convention procedures without prior scrutiny in each case
of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures will
prove effective.").
122. Id. at 544-46.
123. Id. at 544.
124. Id. at 534.
125. Id. at 546; see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Assessing Sovereign Interests in Cross-
Border Discovery Disputes: Lessons from Aerospatiale, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87 (2003); Patricia
Anne Kuhn, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale: The Supreme Court's Misguided
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however, provide clear guidance for balancing, as it stated that district
courts should decide whether to use the Hague Convention procedures
on a case-by-case basis, based on which procedure is likely to be the
most effective. 26 With this lack of clarity, "the lower courts ... found the
Aerospatiale comity analysis cumbersome and unhelpful and have al-
most uniformly refused to order extraterritorial discovery pursuant to the
Hague [Convention] *,121
The U.S. federal civil discovery rules set forth in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are powerful procedural tools, as they can impose on
a party the heavy burden of producing everything that is relevant to the
litigation, including self-incriminating documents.2 8 From a strategic
viewpoint, the discovery rules represent a strong incentive to sue, espe-
cially when combined with the prospect of treble damages. 29 The
discovery of the defendant's documents offsets, or substantially lessens,
the plaintiff's cumbersome task of providing the court with evidence of
the defendant's wrongdoing. Nevertheless, discovery vastly increases the
time and cost of litigation, and while at the pre-trial stage, it represents
the main leverage inducing a defendant to settle, even when the case
could be successfully litigated.' 30
Approach to the Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (1989); Jenny S. Marti-
nez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2004).
126. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543-44; see also id. at 546 ("The exact line between rea-
sonableness and unreasonableness in each case must be drawn by the trial court, based on its
knowledge of the case and of the claims and interests of the parties and the government whose
statutes and policies they invoke.").
127. Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-Aerospatiale
Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INT'L LAW. 393, 394 (1990).
128. See Nordlander, supra note 5, at 648-49.
129. Id. at 648.
130. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1984) ("It is clear from
experience that pretrial discovery has a significant potential for abuse. This abuse is not lim-
ited to matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests
of litigants and third parties."). In discussing discovery in securities cases, which face similar
evidentiary issues to those that arise in discovery for antitrust cases, the Supreme Court stated,
The potential for possible abuse of the liberal discovery provisions of the federal rules
may likewise exist in this type of case to a greater extent than they do in other litiga-
tion. The prospect of extensive deposition of the defendant's officers and associates
and the concomitant opportunity for extensive discovery of business documents, is a
common occurrence in this and similar types of litigation. To the extent that this proc-
ess eventually produces relevant evidence which is useful in determining the merits of
the claims asserted by the parties, it bears the imprimatur of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and of the many cases liberally interpreting them. But to the extent that it
permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment
of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process will re-
veal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
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The set of provisions governing U.S. civil discovery are far from
isolated and unrelated to one another, but, rather, represent "an inte-
grated mechanism for narrowing the issues and ascertaining the
facts."'' The unique nature of U.S. discovery rules derives from the
broad scope of rules twenty-six through thirty-seven of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and their construction by U.S. courts. Discov-
ery rules are construed liberally in order to "achieve the purpose for
which they are intended.' 32 The intended purpose of the Rules is to
allow a party to "prepare for trial in a manner that will promote the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action as is enjoined
by Rule 1""' In particular, a broad interpretation of the discovery rules
should minimize the risk of "surprise and the possible miscarriage of
justice, to disclose fully the nature and scope of the controversy, to nar-
row, simplify, and frame the issues involved, and to enable a party to
obtain the information needed to prepare for trial.' 34 The basic assump-
tion that justifies such a broad interpretation of the discovery rules is
that the acquisition of evidence is different, and distinct, from the sub-
sequent potential admissibility and use of that evidence at trial.'35
131. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (2d ed. 1994); see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 27, 28, 30-32
(depositions); FED. R. Civ. P. 29 (stipulations regarding the discovery process); FED. R. Civ. P.
33 (interrogatories to parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (production of documents and things and
entry upon land for inspection); FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (physical and mental examination); FED. R.
CIv. P. 36 (requests for admissions).
132. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 131, § 2001.
133. Id.; see FED. R. CIv. P. 1 ("[The Rules] should be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.").
134. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 131, § 2001; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 500 (1947). In Hickman, the Court stated,
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one
of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... The
new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and
invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial.
The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device ... to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the
facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those is-
sues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark.
The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain
the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.
Id.
135. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 131, § 2008 ("[There] is an explicit recognition
that the question of relevancy is to be more loosely construed at the discovery stage than at
trial, where the relevance question for purposes of admissibility is governed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence.").
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Rule 34(a) defines the scope of the production of documents, stat-
ing,
A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope
of Rule 26(b):
(1) to produce and permit the requesting party or its representa-
tive to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the
responding party's possession, custody, or control:
(A) any designated documents or electronically stored informa-
tion ... or
(B) any designated tangible things .... 136
However, there is concern about U.S. courts' application of Rule 34,
since the current standard is that "[d]ocuments that are not trial-
preparation material are freely discoverable on request under Rule 34.'
Moreover, Rule 34 does not provide a clear standard to identify the
documents for production, since it only requires a party making the
document request to "describe with reasonable particularity each item or
category of items to be inspected.' 38Accordingly, courts require that
"the designation be sufficient to apprise a person of ordinary intelligence
what documents are required and that the court be able to ascertain
whether the requested documents have been produced."''
More generally, Rule 26 governs the specific discovery mechanisms
and contains the general provisions on the duty of disclosure, delimitates
the scope of discovery, and coordinates the use of other discovery
rules. 40 The plaintiff may seek discovery of "any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claims or defense... ."' The precise defi-
nition of what is relevant to a litigation is not always clear, and Rule 26
is not susceptible to strict interpretation.'4 2 However, Rule 26(b)(2) sets
forth important limitations on discovery, stating that
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
137. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2205 (2d ed. 1994); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3)(a) ("Ordi-
narily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.....
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(a).
139. 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 137, § 2211.
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 26; see also 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13 1, § 2001.
141. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
142. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 131, § 2008 ("The boundaries defining information
that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the action are necessarily vague and it is prac-
tically impossible to state a general rule by which they can be drawn."); see also Nordlander,
supra note 5, at 648.
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[a] court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery other-
wise allowed ... if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplica-
tive, or can be obtained from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to ob-
tain the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount
in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the is-
sues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery
in resolving the issues.1
43
Although the Leniency documents are not explicitly covered by
those exemptions, Rule 26 "grants [a] court discretion to limit discovery
on several grounds,"'" including the principle of international comity.'"
5
Thus, through Rule 26, courts could exempt Leniency documents from
discovery on the basis of comity considerations.
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY
A. The Principle of International Comity in U.S. Courts
The principle of international Comity aims to avoid the conflict of
laws between States when the interests of more than one sovereign are
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c) (emphasis added).
144. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
145. Id.; see also Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543-44 (1987). Another doctrine employed in opposing discovery
of Leniency documents is investigative privilege. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., Misc. No.
99-197, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25825, at *36-38 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2002). However, in Vita-
mins, the court rejected the claim based on investigative privilege and adopted the Special
Master's argument that the European Commission may invoke the privilege only with respect
to documents in its possession. Id. at *37-38, 64-65. Since the requested corporate statements
were in the defendant's possession, and not the Commission's, the Commission could not
invoke investigative privilege. Id. at *38. Under the New Leniency Notice, undertakings may
submit oral statements, the transcription of which remains with the E.U. Commission, and
undertakings are not provided with a copy, potentially shielding them from discovery. New
Leniency Notice, supra note 2, T 32. Nevertheless, the Commission faces the obstacle that
U.S. courts may order discovery even if the information requested is subject to a non-
disclosure law-so-called "blocking statutes"-in the foreign jurisdiction. See Aerospatiale,
482 U.S. at 544; see also Nordlander, supra note 5, at 657-59 (analyzing the E.U. Commis-
sion's arguments regarding the investigative privilege in opposing discovery of the Leniency
program in a U.S. civil claim).
[Vol. 29:565
The E. U. Leniency Program
involved.46 While this purpose is widely shared by the members of the
international community, its exact content and scope are subject to dif-
ferent interpretations. 47 The doctrine of international comity has long
been debated in U.S. courts.'48 One of its early applications relates to the
limits of the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act in cartel cases,
where, although the anticompetitive conduct had occurred outside of
U.S. territory, it affected U.S. trade or commerce. 49 In cases presenting
such "diversity" patterns, the principle of international comity provides
guidance in determining whether U.S. courts have subject-matter juris-
diction in a particular case.'50 The principle of international comity
compels national courts to give due regard to the interests of foreign
sovereigns when enforcing the rights of citizens of their own State that
will affect interests of other sovereigns.' Therefore, courts should act in
a manner that exhibits respect for the jurisdiction, laws, or judicial deci-
sions of another country.5 2 The Supreme Court in Aerospatiale stated
that comity is
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recog-
nition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws. "'
146. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004).
147. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543-44.
148. See Sam Foster Halabi, The "Comity" of Empagran: The Supreme Court Decides
that Foreign Competition Regulation Limits American Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Interna-
tional Cartels, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 279 (2005); Martinez, supra note 125.
149. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Discussion of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law originated in the very language of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, which permits the application of the Act to agreements that restrain trade
within the United States "or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) ("[I]t is well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States."). The subsequent Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act (FTAIA) shed light on the scope of U.S. jurisdiction over cartel cases. Foreign
Trade Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000). In fact, the FTAIA adopted even
more sibylline language, providing U.S. federal district courts with subject-matter jurisdiction
over conduct that "has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. com-
merce and that "give[s] rise to a claim under the provisions of [the Sherman] Act... " Id.
150. Halabi, supra note 148, at 286.
151. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
152. Id.
153. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 544 n.27 (1987) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)); see also
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (the Restatement) provides a
framework for comity analysis.5 4 Although the Court acknowledged that
the Restatement may not "represent a consensus of international views
on the scope of the district court's power to order foreign discovery in
the face of objections by foreign states," the Court stated that it ad-
dressed "[t]he nature of the concerns that guide a comity analysis . . . .
In particular, the Restatement provides a list of factors that courts
must consider in their comity analysis, including,
(1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other
information requested;
(2) the degree of specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States;
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the informa-
tion; and
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compli-
ance with the request would undermine important interests of
the state where the information is located.
56
This list of factors has been used, and further elaborated on, by the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission in
their 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
tions.' 57 The Guidelines provide that, in their comity analysis, courts
should assess
1. the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct
within the United States, as compared to conduct abroad;
2. the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the
conduct;
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS T 3.2 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/intemat.htm [hereinafter ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS].
154. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28.
155. Id.
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
157. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
supra note 153.
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3. the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers,
markets, or exporters;
4. the relative significance and forseeability of the effects of the
conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
5. the existence of reasonable expectations that would be fur-
thered or defeated by the action;
6. the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign
economic policies;
7. the extent to which the enforcement activities of another
country with respect to the same persons, including remedies re-
sulting from those activities, may be affected; and
8. the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S.
enforcement action.
58
The relative weight given to each factor in a court's comity analysis will
depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. 59
B. The Principle of International Comity in United States-European
Community Agreements
The customary international law principle of comity has been the
subject of at least two important agreements between the European Un-
ion and the United States: the 1991 Agreement on the Application of
their Respective Competition Laws (1991 Competition Laws Agree-
ment)' 60 and the 1998 Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity
Principles in the Enforcement of the Competition Laws (1998 Comity
Principles Agreement).' 61
The 1991 Competition Laws Agreement sets forth a detailed mecha-
nism of early notification and consultation regarding both merger and
non-merger policy decisions that may affect important interests of the
other party to the Agreement. '62 It also lists several factors to consider
when balancing the competing interests in cases in which the enforce-
ment activity in one jurisdiction may adversely affect important interests
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition
Laws, 1995 O.J. (L 95) 47 [hereinafter 1991 Competition Laws Agreement].
161. Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the United
States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of
Their Competition Laws, 1998 O.J. (L 173) 28 [hereinafter 1998 Comity Principles Agree-
ment].
162. 1991 Competition Laws Agreement, supra note 160, art. II.
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of the other jurisdiction.'63 Most importantly, Article VIII of the Agree-
ment regulates the disclosure of confidential information and limits the
right of each party to access such information "if disclosure of that in-
formation (a) is prohibited by the law of the Party possessing the
information or (b) would be incompatible with important interests of the
Party possessing the information."' '6 The 1998 Comity Principles
Agreement recognizes that the 1991 Competition Laws Agreement "con-
tributed to coordination, cooperation, and avoidance of conflicts in
competition law enforcement" and interprets the principle of positive
comity in such a way as to strengthen the effectiveness of the 1991
Competition Laws Agreement.' 65
In applying these limits to the disclosure of information provided by
Leniency applicants, it is evident that corporate statements in particular
should be exempt from disclosure, since they meet both of the thresholds
set forth in Article VIII of the 1991 Competition Laws Agreement. Un-
der the New Leniency Notice, the information provided by Leniency
applicants cannot be disclosed or used for any purpose other than the
enforcement of Article 81 of the E.C. Treaty.'6 Clearly, private actions
for damages in the United States do not constitute enforcement of Article
81. Moreover, information provided by Leniency applicants cannot be
disclosed to third parties-including U.S. courts-without the appli-
cant's consent, because this would "undermine the protection of the
purpose of inspections and investigations within the meaning of Article
4(2) of [Transparency] Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European
Parliament and of the Council.' ' 67 Finally, the Commission has a critical
interest in not disclosing information provided for the purpose of the
New Leniency Notice, as it would likely undermine the effective en-
forcement of E.U. competition law by dramatically decreasing the
incentives for undertakings to cooperate in the Commission's anti-cartel
• 68
activity.
163. Id. art. Vl(3).
164. Id. art. VIII(l); see also id. art. VIII(2). Article VHI(2) states,
Each Party agrees to maintain, to the fullest extent possible, the confidentiality of
any information provided to it in confidence by the other Party under this Agree-
ment and to oppose, to the fullest extent possible, any application for disclosure of
such information by a third party that is not authorized by the Party that supplied
the information.
Id. art. VIII(2).
165. 1998 Comity Principles Agreement, supra note 161, pmbl.
166. See New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 34.
167. 2002 Leniency Notice, supra note 52, 1 32; see also INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,
ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TEMPLATE II (Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
comm/competition/intemational/multilateral/template.pdf.
168. See New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 6.
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From an antitrust policy perspective, the foregoing considerations
require that the Commission's administrative file be exempt from the
general rule of disclosure. Stated in other words, U.S. agencies should be
prevented from obtaining this particular type of information, the disclo-
sure of which is "prohibited by the law of the Party possessing the
information," or would otherwise "be incompatible with its important
interests. ' 69
The fundamental weakness of this interpretation of the 1991 Compe-
tition Laws Agreement is that the latter only applies to the relationships
between administrative agencies and is not binding on U.S. courts. How-
ever, a construction of the 1991 Competition Laws Agreement respectful
of important E.U. antitrust policy considerations would urge U.S. courts
to interpret the meaning of its provisions in light of the legal and cultural
environment in which they are enforced. Currently, in the United States,
administrative agencies and private plaintiffs both enforce antitrust
rules. 7 ° The United States, more than any other jurisdiction, has a liti-
gious culture that promotes private antitrust actions for damages.' 7' As a
consequence, interpreting the provisions of the 1991 Competition Laws
Agreement in such a way that they only apply to cases of public en-
forcement of the antitrust laws may substantially limit the scope of the
provisions to a residual part of litigation and significantly weaken the
overall effectiveness of the 1991 Competition Laws Agreement.
A suggested alternative interpretation of Article VIII of the 1991
Competition Laws Agreement is that it does not represent a technical or
procedural rule regulating the disclosure of a particular type of informa-
tion between agencies, but a set of policy provisions whose purpose is
deeply shared by the policymakers of the United States and Europe. Ac-
cordingly, U.S. courts should look to those provisions as guidance in
deciding whether to compel discovery of Leniency documents in a par-
ticular case.1
7 2
169. 1991 Competition Laws Agreement, supra note 160, art. VIII(I ).
170. See Bloom, supra note 21, at 433.
171. Id. at 436.
172. In addition to the comity justification, there are other compelling reasons that sug-
gest the non-discoverability of the Leniency documents. Leniency applicants and, in general,
addressees of a statement of objection, are themselves subject to a number of limitations re-
garding access and disclosure of the information on file with the Commission. See supra Part
II.C.
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C. The Principle of Comity and Discovery
of the Leniency Documents on File
with the E. U. Commission
U.S. federal courts have examined comity limits on the discovery of
Leniency documents on file with the E.U. Commission in only two
cases: In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation (Vitamins)73 and In re Methion-
ine Antitrust Litigation (Methionine). 7 4 Nonetheless, the comity analysis
resulted in two diametrically opposed opinions.
7 5
In Vitamins, the Special Master recommended granting plaintiffs'
motion to compel discovery of the Leniency documents, finding that the
E.U. Commission's comity concerns were "insufficient to protect the
defendants' submissions to these authorities from disclosure standing on
their own and when they are weighed against the U.S. interests in open
discovery and enforcement of its antitrust laws.' 76
In contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, in Methionine, denied a motion to compel discovery, finding that
the E.U. Commission's interests outweighed the plaintiffs' interests in
obtaining the unredacted copy of the defendant's Leniency application.'
The Methionine court agreed with the Special Master that production of
the corporate statement might have a chilling effect on antitrust en-
forcement in the European Union. 178 Nonetheless, the weight of the
opinion should not be overestimated, as the comity analysis was heavily
influenced by the minimal value that the discovery of the full, unre-
dacted version of the defendant's Leniency application would have
added to the already exhaustive information possessed by the plaintiff.
79
173. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 99-197, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25815
(D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2002).
174. In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., Master File No. C99-3491, Report of Special
Master (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2002).
175. Although the Methionine court carried out a comity analysis, its opinion was
strongly influenced by the exceptional circumstance that the plaintiffs already possessed a
redacted copy of the defendant's corporate statement. Id.
176. Vitamins, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25815, at *125.
177. Methionine, Report of Special Master, at 13.
178. Id.
179. Nordlander, supra note 5, at 652.
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V. THE CALIFORNIA DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IN IN RE RUBBER
CHEMICALS ANTITRUST LITIGATION
A. The Relevant Facts
The California District Court's order in In re Rubber Chemicals An-
titrust Litigation80 follows the Vitamin and Methionine cases with an
important analysis of the comity principles in relation to the discovery of
Leniency submissions.
In 2002, Flexsys N.V. (Flexsys) disclosed to the DG COMP the exis-
tence of anti-competitive practices in the rubber chemicals industry and
solicited immunity from fines pursuant to the Leniency Program.'8 After
a three-year investigation, the Commission found that eight companies,
including Flexsys,'82 had infringed Article 81(1) of the E.C. Treaty by
participating in agreements and concerted practices "consisting of price
fixing and the exchange of confidential information in the rubber chemi-
cals sector"-antioxidants, antiozoants, and primary accelerators-in the
EEA and in worldwide markets.'83 The Commission imposed fines total-
ing C88.61 million,' ' and Flexsys was granted immunity from fine under
the 2002 Leniency Program.' 5
In 2006, Kumho Petrochemical (Kumho) brought a civil antitrust
suit against Flexsys America LP, its European affiliate, Flexsys, and
other companies, alleging that they unlawfully excluded Kumho from
the U.S. rubber chemicals market.86 During discovery, Kumho filed a
motion to compel production of Flexsys America's documents relating to
the investigations of suspected anticompetitive conduct in the rubber
chemicals sector conducted in the United States, Canada, and the Euro-
pean Union.
8 7
Flexsys objected to Kumho's requests on a variety of grounds' 88 but
finally produced documents relating to the U.S. and Canadian investiga-
tions, as well as all of the business information and pre-existing
documents that had been provided to the European Commission.' Those
180. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litigation, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
181. E. U. Rubber Chemicals, supra note 99.
182. The companies involved in the sanctioned cartel were Flexsys N.V., Bayer AG,
Crompton Manufacturing Company Inc. (formerly Uniroyal Chemical Company Inc.),
Crompton Europe Ltd., Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation), General
Qufmica SA, Repsol Qufmica SA, and Repsol YPF SA. Id. 1.
183. Id. 2, 30. The cartel's actions also affected markets in Canada and the United
States. See Rubber Chems., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
184. E.U. Rubber Chemicals, supra note 99, 32.
185. Id. [23.
186. Rubber Chems., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1080-81.
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documents totaled some 38,000 pages.'90 The only documents that Flex-
sys refused to produce were the communications and corporate
statements it provided to the E.U. Commission under the Leniency Pro-
gram (European documents). 9 '
B. Analysis of the Case
The order of the California district court is one of the few cases in
which a U.S. court performed the comity analysis in a way that gave sig-
nificant weight to the interests of the E.U. Commission in preserving and
enhancing the enforcement of E.U. antitrust laws. Similar to the Vitamins
and the Methionine cases, the California district court applied the Aero-
spatiale multi-prong test. 92 This test requires courts to balance several
competing factors, which are:
(1) the importance to the.., litigation of the documents or other
information requested;
(2) the degree of specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States;
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the informa-
tion; and
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compli-
ance with the request would undermine important interests of
the state where the information is located.
93
Judge Zimmerman carried out a comprehensive comity analysis of
all of the interests involved in the litigation. '9 The court recognized that,
190. Defendant Flexsys America L.P.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff Korea
Kumho Petrochemical Co., Ltd.'s Motion to Compel Production at 3, In re Rubber Chems.
Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
191. Rubber Chems., 486 F Supp. 2d at 1081.
192. See supra text accompanying note 157.
193. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987) (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 156, § 442); see also Rich-
mark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992). The court
stated,
[T]his list of factors is not exhaustive. Other factors may be considered, such as the
extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement would impose
upon the person, . . . [and] the extent to which enforcement by action of either state
can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that
state.
Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1475 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
194. Rubber Chems., 486 E Supp. 2d at 1082-84.
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while comity is not "a matter of absolute obligation," a court undertaking
review "should exercise special vigilance to demonstrate due respect for
any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state."'95 Although it is true
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize discovery of any evi-
dence that is relevant to any party's claim or defense, Rule 26 grants
courts the discretion to limit discovery on several grounds-comity is
one of them.'96
Plaintiffs in Rubber Chemicals attempted to refute the applicability
of comity by arguing that the E.U. Commission is a mere administrative
enforcer of European law and, thus, it is not entitled to comity. 97 The
court rejected this argument, relying on Supreme Court precedent that
the Commission is not just the administrative and executive arm of the
European Union,'" but also the entity responsible for a "wide range of
subject areas covered by the European Union Treaty ... includ[ing] the
treaty provisions, and pursuant regulations, governing Competition!""
Accordingly, the E.U. Commission represents a tribunal within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), and is entitled to comity.2°°
Having determined this, the magistrate judge then applied the Aero-
spatiale test.20' As to the first factor-importance of the documents
requested-the court "failfed] to see the importance or relevance of the
E.C. documents," since these documents pertained to the defendant's
participation in a conspiracy to exclude competitors from the European
202
rubber chemicals market. Moreover, as to the infringement that inter-
sected with U.S. and Canadian markets, defendants had already
produced all documents relating to the investigations by the DOJ and the
195. Id. at 1081 (citation omitted); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241, 262 (2004); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fortress Re Inc., No. M8-85, 2002
WL 1870084, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14,2002).
196. Rubber Chems., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
197. Id. at 1081-82. The plaintiffs also argued that the letter filed with the court by Kir-
tikumar Mehta, Director of DG Competition, did not accurately state the Commission's view.
Id. at 1082. The court rejected this claim, finding that the "DG Competition, operating under
the Commission's aegis, is the European Union's primary antitrust law enforcer." Id. (quoting
Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 250). Therefore, the court held that "[f]ar from being a mere 'bureau-
crat,' . . . Mr. Mehta seems analogous to the head of the Justice [D]epartment's Antitrust
Division," and, accordingly, Mehta's letter expressed the views of the Commission. Id.
198. Id. at 1081.
199. Id. (citing Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 250).
200. Id. at 1082 (citation omitted); see also Empagran S.A. v. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd.,
453 F Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2006); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 99-197, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25815, at *33 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2002) ("[T]he concerns of the [European Com-
munity] should be addressed out of respect for the [European Community] as a foreign
sovereign.").
201. Rubber Chems., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
202. Id. at 1083.
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Canadian Competition Bureau.2 The production of these documents
was significant in the court's appraisal, as "courts are less inclined to
ignore [a] foreign state's concerns where ... the evidence sought is cu-
mulative of existing evidence. '2°4 The court found that the European
documents not submitted were not relevant under this prong of the Aero-
spatiale test.'05
As to the second factor-the specificity of the request-the court
cited the well-established rule that "generalized searches for information
whose disclosure is prohibited under foreign law are discouraged.
'2 °0 6
However, plaintiffs' request for the European documents was sufficiently
specific, and Flexsys did not object on this ground.20 7 Thus, the court
found that the specificity threshold had been met.208
With regard to the third factor-whether the information originated
in the United States-the court held that the European documents did
not originate in the United States, as they were prepared by Flexsys,
N.V.-not Flexsys America-and Commission officials in Belgium. 209
The fact that Flexsys could access these documents in the United States
was "not dispositive" of the issue for the court.20
The court then considered the fourth factor in the comity analysis-
whether the information could be obtained through different means.
2
11
The court found in favor of the defendant, holding that Kumho's request
consisted, in large part, of information it already possessed.22 In particu-
lar, the court considered whether the Commission's decision itself
provided a significant amount of information on the conspiracy.23 The
court deemed it unlikely that the information provided in the European
documents could be more relevant than that submitted to the DOJ in the
• • • 214
course of its investigation. The court reasoned that since "Kumho as-
sert[ed] that Flexsys [had] conspired to keep it out of the U.S. market,
... any admission made to DOJ likely involves an admission of wrong-
doing within the [United States] .,215 Moreover, the court ruled that when
203. Id. at 1080-81.
204. Id. at 1082 (citing Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468,
1475 (9th Cir. 1992)).
205. Id. at 1083.
206. Id. (citing Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1475).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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"the information sought can easily be obtained elsewhere, there is little
or no reason to offend foreign law."
216
Finally, the court analyzed the last, and most complex, factor in the
comity analysis-whether noncompliance with the discovery request
would undermine important interests of the United States, or, in contrast,
whether compliance would undermine important interests of the State in
which the information is located. 2 7 The answer to these questions re-
quired a balancing of the principle of comity with the policies
underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . Moreover, as the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated when performing a similar analy-
sis, courts must consider "expressions of interest by the foreign state,"
"the significance of disclosure in the regulation ... of the activity in
question," and "indications of the foreign State's concern for confidenti-
ality prior to the controversy. 219 The court recognized the importance of
the letter filed by DG COMP as expressing the Commission's "strong
objection to the production of the statements sought by Kumho.' '220 The
court also weighed the legal constraints imposed on Flexsys by E.U. law,
which prevented the company from disclosing the information sought by
Kumho.22
Moreover, while minimizing the fact that the Commission's investi-
gation had already concluded when Kumho sought discovery, and, thus,
there was no concern about the antitrust proceedings, the court assessed
whether producing the European documents would undermine the
Commission's ability to prosecute future investigations. Based on all
of these concerns, the Court concluded,
[A]ny marginal benefit that the plaintiff would gain from disclo-
sure is outweighed by the impact that disclosure will have on the
Commission's interests in the effective enforcement of its com-
petition laws and its cooperation with the U.S. to enforce those
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1083-84.
218. Id. at 1084; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 156, § 442.
219. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 156, § 442 cmt. C).
220. Rubber Chems, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. The Court noted, "The Commission states
that given the crucial investigative and evidentiary value of corporate statements and voluntary
submissions, the protection of these documents is 'indispensable to ensure the viability and
efficacy of the Leniency Programme,' which the Commission has described as the E.U.'s most
effective tool in combating illegal cartels." Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.; see also New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 40 ("The Commission considers
that normally public disclosure of documents and written or recorded statements received in
the context of this notice would undermine certain public or private interests ... even after the
decision has been taken." (emphasis added)).
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laws internationally, especially considering that the other factors
substantially disfavor production.2 3
After considering the Commission's "clear position and articulated
reasons" why production would impair the Leniency Program, and per-
forming a comity analysis considering the "sensitive balance" between
the "conflicting interests of comity and discovery," the court determined
that "principles of comity outweigh the policies underlying discovery. 224
Accordingly, the court issued an order denying the motion to compel
discovery of the European documents.25
VI. CONCLUSION
The threat of discovery of Leniency documents, and the associated
actions for damages, are critical factors affecting the enforcement of the
Leniency Program. The undertakings' primary leverage for collaborating
with public agencies in the dismantling of secret cartels is the chance to
be awarded immunity from, or a reduction of, the fine.226 Unlike the U.S.
antitrust system, that of the European Union does not criminalize anti-
competitive practices, nor does it rely on a well-developed private
enforcement of antitrust rules. 7
The U.S. government is aware of the interplay between private and
public enforcement, as well as the disincentives that discovery of docu-
ments submitted to antitrust agencies under a leniency program are
likely to have on private enforcement. In fact, in 2004, Congress passed
the Antitrust Criminal and Penalty Enhancement Act, which attempts to
offset some of the potential disincentives created by the federal civil dis-
covery rules. 228 The Act provides that, in cases following antitrust
criminal convictions, undertakings that qualify for the U.S. leniency pro-
gram and cooperate with plaintiffs are subject to single damages
actions-instead of treble-and are not jointly and severally liable for
the damages potentially awarded by the courts.229 Not surprisingly, the
same rationale does not apply to European leniency applicants.23 °
223. Rubber Chems., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. New Leniency Notice, supra note 2, 1 3.
227. See Bloom, supra note 21, at 440, 444.
228. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, 118 Stat. 661.
229. Id. at 666-67, § 213.
230. In principle, nothing would prevent the U.S. enforcer from positively weighing the
fact that an undertaking has previously collaborated, or is still collaborating, with the E.U.
Commission under its Leniency Program in dismantling a global cartel. The approach of the
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As the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged in F Hoffinann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, "a harmony [between the laws of nations and
the way that they are enforced is] particularly needed in today's highly
interdependent commercial world."23' A single agency on its own has
little chance to succeed in the fight against cartels that are increasingly
global in scope. The DOJ acknowledged that "effective prosecution of an
international cartel requires coordination of investigative strategies with
foreign enforcement agencies. 232 With close cooperation comes "an in-
creasingly greater risk of detection, prosecution, and punishment by
antitrust authorities ... around the world.' 233 As discussed above, the
need for cooperation has been formalized in several bilateral agree-
234
ments, and is constantly discussed within a number of international
institutional contexts, such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development and the International Competition Network, in which
both the United States and the Commission play a central role. 235 The
Achilles heel of the existing international network, however, is that none
of the agreements, recommendations, or guidelines is binding on the par-
ties.236 Moreover, there is no way to enforce potential noncompliance
with those acts. 37
In practice, the meeting of minds of the European Union and the
United States as to a common construction of the principle of comity is
undermined by the wide discretion of U.S. courts, which still address the
issue on a case-by-case basis.238 This approach exposes Leniency appli-
cants to an inherent risk that U.S. courts might consider comity reasons
insufficiently strong to prevent discovery of Leniency documents in civil
actions for damages.239 In turn, the resulting uncertainty may have a
U.S. legislature, however, seems to focus on cases following a criminal conviction, and E.U.
antitrust rules do not provide criminal actions for antitrust violations. See supra text accom-
panying notes 23-25.
231. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004).
232. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22, F Hoffman-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); see also Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of
Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, A Review of Recent Cases and Develop-
ments in the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, Presentation to the 2002
Antitrust Conference: Antitrust Issues in Today's Economy 11-12 (Mar. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10862.pdf [hereinafter Hammond Presentation].
233. Hammond Presentation, supra note 232, at 19.
234. See supra Part IV.B.
235. See International Competition Network Operational Framework, available at http://
www.interationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
236. Id.
237. The only means by which to make agreements or recommendations somehow bind-
ing is retaliation.
238. See Submission by the Directorate General for Competition of the European Com-
mission, supra note 6, at 1.
239. Id.
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chilling effect on the Leniency Program and the E.U. Commission's abil-
ity to fight cartels, as the potential whistleblowers will carefully balance
the risk of exposure to treble damages actions with the advantages of
E.U. immunity.24° U.S. courts should acknowledge the foregoing consid-
erations and consistently interpret the principle of international comity in
an effort to strengthen international cooperation against cartels.
240. Id.
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